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Abstract
This article makes the case for strengthening co-operation between regional financing arrange-
ments (RFAs) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and examines ways to do so. It
argues that ex ante co-operation between RFAs and the IMF is needed to reduce the risk of co-
operation failing in the middle of a crisis, to help avoid “forum shopping” and institutional
arbitrage, to prevent weakening the IMF’s role as the guardian of global financial stability, to
minimise duplication, and to generate mutual benefits from a division of labour and speciali-
sation based on the comparative advantages of the respective institutions. It calls for guidelines
for organising the inter-institutional relations between the IMF and RFAs, a clear division of
labour in crisis lending, and co-operation and exchange in surveillance and analysis. Co-oper-
ation with RFAs should be seen as a chance for the IMF to overcome its stigmatisation,
strengthen its global role and ensure its continued relevance.
This paper benefited from comments received at presentations in a conference on “Reforming
the Global Monetary System” organised by the Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia Uni-
versity and the School of Finance at the Central University of Finance and Economics in Bei-
jing in March 2011, a workshop on “Regional Financing Arrangements and the IMF” at the
Banco de España in Madrid in April 2011, and a conference on “Financial Regionalism and
Macroeconomic Stability” organised by the Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas in Cartagena
de Indias in July 2012. Comments by workshop participants, especially Lorenzo Giorgianni,
Stephany Griffith-Jones, Pilar L’Hotellerie-Fallois, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Julie McKay, Pablo
Moreno, José Antonio Ocampo, Yung Chul Park, Chalongphob Sussangkarn and Yunjong
Wang are gratefully acknowledged. Many thanks also go to Kathrin Berensmann, Julia
Leininger and Peter Wolff for commenting on an earlier draft. Any shortcomings are my own.
Keywords: IMF, regional financing arrangements, international co-operation, international
monetary and financial stability
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has enjoyed a good crisis, during which
the G20 affirmed the Fund’s central role in the international financial system and agreed to
quadruple its lending capacity to over USD 1.3 trillion. Although before the global financial
crisis, the Fund seemed to have become irrelevant in the eyes of many and was mocked by the
Economist magazine as the “Turkish Monetary Fund” (Economist 2007) – because a loan to
Ankara accounted for two-thirds of its outstanding credit – it now is experiencing increased
lending activity in both developing and advanced countries (e.g. Meltzer 2011). With the G20’s
Mutual Assessment Process, it also has been assigned a greater role in global economic and
financial governance. Yet huge challenges remain. The Fund still suffers from a lack of credi-
bility and resentment on the part of member states, especially in East Asia and Latin America.
Moreover, it has not yet managed to remove the stigma that its lending programmes have in
most of the developing world. This stigma is one reason why the IMF has faced increasing com-
petition in short-term lending from the World Bank and regional development banks, bilateral
swap lines and regional financing arrangements (RFAs).1
Defined by McKay et al. (2011, 1) as “an arrangement within which a group of countries pledges
financial support to other members of that group that are experiencing balance of payment prob-
lems, either through a pool of contributed or borrowed reserves or through the swap of financial
assets (usually foreign exchange reserves)”, RFAs are receiving more attention and increasingly
are regarded as important constituents of the evolving international financial architecture. The in-
ternational community has acknowledged the importance of RFAs and their prospective contribu-
tion to a global financial safety net, as well as the necessity of strengthening co-operation between
the IMF and RFAs to avoid unhealthy competition and ensure smooth co-operation in times of cri-
sis. In the final declaration of the Cannes Summit in November 2011, the G20 leaders agreed “to
further strengthen global financial safety nets in which national governments, central banks, re-
gional financial arrangements and international financial institutions will each play a role
according to and within their respective mandate” (G20 2011a, §14). They also agreed on com-
mon principles for co-operation between the IMF and RFAs “which will strengthen crisis preven-
tion and resolution efforts” (ibid.). In their “Enhancing the IMF’s Response Capacity and Surveil-
lance” communiqué, the G20 leaders stated:
“The G20 countries have agreed on principles of cooperation between the IMF and
Regional Financial Arrangements to profit fully from the understanding that the Regional
Financial Arrangements have of the running of the economies in their area (thanks to their
regional focus) and from the IMF’s greater surveillance capacity (thanks to its global
vision). In times of crisis, greater coherence will be ensured between the lending conditions
set out by Regional Financial Arrangements and the IMF, while providing the IMF with
preferred creditor status.” (G20 2011b, 1)
Against this background, this article discusses two questions: First, what is the case for co-opera-
tion between RFAs and the IMF? And second, what are the possible forms of co-operation? The
discussion is based on three premises: (i) given the growing clout and financial resources of the
major emerging market economies that back most of them, RFAs are not only here to stay but
1 For an overview of foreign exchange swap arrangements between central banks, see Fender and Gyntelberg
(2008, 14–15).
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also are likely to gain in importance; (ii) we need a strong IMF to ensure global financial stabili-
ty; and (iii) RFAs and the IMF can complement each other and contribute to strengthening the
global monetary system, as recently argued by McKay et al. (2011).
The rest of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses motivations for a country to
join an RFA and the factors that have made RFAs more attractive as an alternative source of 
liquidity financing for member states than IMF financing. Section 3 then analyses the need to
strengthen co-operation between RFAs and the IMF. Subsequently, Section 4 reflects on the G20
principles of co-operation between the IMF and RFAs and discusses modes of co-operation be-
tween RFAs and the IMF that could ensure the efficient co-existence of regional and global
liquidity providers that supports international financial stability. It also reviews recent examples
of co-operation between the Fund and European authorities. Section 5 concludes.
2 Why do RFAs exist?
Historically, RFAs were created to complement real economic integration processes and pro-
vide rapid crisis support to member states. Despite the existence of a global lender, namely the
IMF, a region might choose to create an RFA for at least three reasons. First, RFAs can help
reinforce regional economic and financial co-operation, most especially by strengthening re-
gional surveillance and monitoring, which is hoped to reduce the risk of financial contagion in
the face of developing regional economic ties. Second, RFAs can supplement IMF lending so
that member countries need not rely on the IMF alone. In particular, RFAs can help member
countries bridge temporary liquidity shortages so they need not apply for an IMF programme,
or bridge the time until a (larger) IMF arrangement is agreed. A third motivation for establish-
ing or expanding an RFA is dissatisfaction with the IMF. This dissatisfaction may relate to IMF
policies (including the speed and conditionality of loans), IMF governance and a lack of own-
ership and the stigma attached to IMF lending. Member governments can use RFAs to under-
score their demands for IMF reform and threaten a loss of interest in the IMF unless they get
more say in the Fund’s governance and policies or, if the Fund and member governments are
already alienated, an RFA could become a full-fledged substitute for IMF lending, allowing
countries to bypass the Fund entirely. Member governments may seek to develop alternatives
to the Fund if they believe that the stigma of borrowing from the IMF is politically too costly.
The first and second motivations can make RFAs important complements to IMF lending and
contribute to regional and global financial stability. However, if a region develops an RFA for
the third reason, the Fund’s authority and ability to effectively carry out its mandate could be
eroded (McKay et al. 2011).
The development of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in East Asia illustrates why countries that
long had almost no interest in any form of regional economic co-operation (not to speak of
financial co-operation), started to take an interest in regional financial co-operation, including
establishment of an RFA. The financial crisis of 1997–98 marked a turning point for East Asia;
as Padoa-Schioppa (2005, 30) wrote, it was “the key catalytic event to propel regional co-
operation” in the region. Not only did the Asian crisis reveal the dangers of regional financial
contagion and the importance of policy-co-ordination for preventing future crises, it also
evoked great discontent about how the crisis was handled by the international community, and
2 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
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the IMF in particular. IMF opposition to the Japanese Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposal
in 1997 reinforced the resentment.2 The Korean economist Il Sakong expressed the widespread
view of East Asian policy makers when he said, “[w]e need to have some kind of defence mech-
anism. Since not much is expected to be done at the global level, something should be done at
the regional level” (Montagnon 2000, 9). The 2000 launch of the CMI as a network of bilater-
al swap agreements among the ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and Korea (known as ASEAN+3) should be seen against this
background.3 In 2010, the CMI was transformed into the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilaterali-
sation (CMIM), a self-managed reserve pooling arrangement endowed with USD 120 billion
of the region’s foreign exchange reserves. The CMIM was brought closer towards an “Asian
Monetary Fund” when the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was set up in
Singapore in April 2011. In May 2012, it was agreed to double the amounts available under the
CMIM to USD 240 billion.
During the global financial crisis, the CMI was not activated because of its “IMF link”, which
at the time stipulated that a country can only access 20 % of the funds available from the CMI
without having an IMF programme. That meant that in principle Korea – in need of foreign
currency liquidity support in 2008 – could have accessed USD 18.5 billion under the CMI, but
because it had no IMF programme, it was limited to just USD 3.7 billion. Korea arranged a
USD 30 billion swap with the US Federal Reserve instead – followed by other swaps with
China and Japan. This shows how the CMI(M) link to the IMF renders it ineffective, since more
than a decade after the Asian crisis borrowing from the IMF remains stigmatised – and thus too
costly for East Asian governments.4
The IMF is still regarded as being dominated by American and European interests and unre-
sponsive to Asian concerns. In Korea, the crisis of 1997 is still today commonly referred to as
the “IMF crisis”, with the IMF acronym standing for “I’M Fired”. The Financial Times com-
ment of 2004 (when a candidate for finance minister was vetoed because she had worked at the
Fund) that, in Indonesia, “the IMF label on any policy is virtually a kiss of death” still holds
true. When the Indonesian government needed support in March 2009, instead of turning to the
IMF, it secured a USD 2 billion Development Policy Loan with a deferred drawdown option
from the World Bank (Marino / Volz 2012, 26), which was renewed in May 2012.
Several ASEAN countries are demanding that the CMIM will sever ties to the IMF once AM-
RO has built up sufficient capacity to survey and monitor regional financial markets. Already
in May 2012, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors decided “to in-
crease the IMF de-linked portion to 30% in 2012 with a view to increasing it to 40% in 2014
subject to review should conditions warrant” (ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors 2012, 7.ii).5
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 3
2 It should be noted that at the time, China also opposed the Japanese AMF proposal.
3 The ten ASEAN members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand and Vietnam.
4 On the IMF’s stigma in Asia, see Ito (2012).
5 For a discussion of recent developments in regional financial and monetary co-operation in East Asia, see
Volz (2012).
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3 The need for greater co-operation between RFAs and the IMF
As Henning (2011) points out, currently no explicit set of rules or formal conventions guides
the relationship between RFAs and the IMF. In the past there were cases of ad hoc co-opera-
tion or informal conventions, but nothing to compare with Article XXIV of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services that set
out the rules of the international trade regime and guide the relationship between customs
unions and free trade areas and the global trade regime under the World Trade Organization.
Henning persuasively argues that co-operation should begin before a crisis hits to reduce the
risk of co-operation failing in the middle of a crisis. The additional time that is needed to agree
modes of co-operation in the midst of a crisis can be costly. The recent, relatively smooth co-
operation between the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB)
should not be taken for granted in other regions.6
There are other arguments in favour of ex ante co-operation between RFAs and the IMF:7
(i) co-operation would help to avoid “forum shopping” and institutional arbitrage; (ii) co-oper-
ation would prevent weakening the IMF’s role as the guardian of global financial stability, a
role that RFAs cannot assume because of their limited regional mandates; (iii) co-operation
would minimise duplication, while at the same time allowing for healthy institutional competi-
tion; (iv) co-operation would ensure that the resources provided by one institution are addi-
tional, rather than substitutes for the resources provided by another institution; and (v) co-op-
eration would generate mutual benefits from a division of labour and specialisation based on
the comparative advantages of the respective institutions.
Moreover, co-operation with RFAs should be seen as a chance for the IMF to strengthen its
global role and ensure its continued relevance. To overcome its stigmatisation, the IMF needs
to engage with RFAs. The IMF has changed significantly over the last decade: it has become
more transparent, it has made advances in governance reform, giving a greater say to develop-
ing and emerging economies, and it has overhauled its lending facilities and conditionality.8Yet
many developing and emerging economies still resent the IMF, and for that reason have become
more interested in RFAs. Co-operation with RFAs should be viewed as an opportunity to bridge
the divide and increase regional and local ownership of potential IMF programmes. Co-opera-
tion does not preclude competition; indeed, competition for the best analysis and of the bright-
est ideas should be welcome.
6 Although the IMF staff’s discontentment with the European strategy has not been made public, its
collaboration on the Greek programme has already experienced severe tensions. John Dizard (2012) com-
mented in the Financial Times, “Never mind the disagreements between the Greeks and the ‘troika’ of the eu-
ro group, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Those are predictable. Though I
was surprised at how annoyed IMF officials became with their counterparts at the ECB over its unwilling-
ness to book any losses on their Greek securities.”
7 Cf. Henning (2010, 2011) and McKay et al. (2011).
8 See Marino and Volz (2012) for early experience with the IMF’s recent precautionary facilities.
Ulrich Volz
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4 Ways to co-operate
On 15 October 2011, in preparation for the Cannes Summit, the G20 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors (2011) agreed on six “Principles for Cooperation between the IMF and
Regional Financing Arrangements”, that were endorsed by the G20 leaders in Cannes the
following month.9 The principles are reproduced in Box 1.
Agreement on these principles among the G20 leaders is a welcome development. But there are
two problems with these “non-binding broad principles for cooperation”: first, they are non-
binding, which means that they may or may not be considered in the future; and second, they
are very broad and hardly go beyond a general agreement that co-operation between RFAs and
the IMF is welcome.
Of course, when discussing co-operation between the IMF and RFAs, it is important to ac-
knowledge the differences as well as comparative advantages of respective RFAs. Figure 1
Box 1: G20 Principles for co-operation between the IMF and RFAs 
Source: G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2011).
Based on contributions by the EU [European Union] and by ASEAN+3 countries members of the G20,
the following non-binding broad principles for cooperation have been agreed. Also, collaboration with
the IMF should be tailored to each RFA in a flexible manner in order to take account of region-specific
circumstances and the characteristics of RFAs.
1) An enhanced cooperation between RFAs and the IMF would be a step forward towards better crisis
prevention, more effective crisis resolution and would reduce moral hazard. Cooperation between
RFAs and the IMF should foster rigorous and even-handed surveillance and promote the common 
goals of regional and global financial and monetary stability.
2) Cooperation should respect the roles, independence and decision-making processes of each institu-
tion, taking into account regional specificities in a flexible manner.
3) While cooperation between RFAs and the IMF may be triggered by a crisis, ongoing collaboration 
should be promoted as a way to build regional capacity for crisis prevention.
4) Cooperation should commence as early as possible and include open sharing of information and joint 
missions where necessary. It is clear that each institution has comparative advantages and would ben-
efit from the expertise of the other. Specifically, RFAs have better understanding of regional circum-
stances and the IMF has a greater global surveillance capacity.
5) Consistency of lending conditions should be sought to the extent possible, in order to prevent arbi-
trage and facility shopping, in particular as concerns policy conditions and facility pricing. However, 
some flexibility would be needed as regards adjustments to conditionality, if necessary, and on the 
timing of the reviews. In addition, definitive decisions about financial assistance within a joint pro-
gramme should be taken by the respective institutions participating in the programme.
6) RFAs must respect the preferred creditor status of the IMF.
9 With the Korean G20 Presidency’s insistence that a global financial safety net be developed, the G20 leaders
acknowledged the “need to do further work to improve our capacity to cope with future crises” and tasked the
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at the Seoul Summit in November 2010 “to explore, with in-
put from the IMF: A. A structured approach to cope with shocks of a systemic nature. B. Ways to improve
collaboration between RFAs and the IMF across all possible areas and enhance the capability of RFAs for
crisis prevention, while recognizing region-specific circumstances and characteristics of each RFA.”
(G20 2010, § 25)
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shows attempts by McKay et al. (2010) to use different criteria to evaluate five RFAs and com-
pare their performances with the IMF.10 While the specific ratings can be debated, the respec-
tive RFAs and the IMF are clearly shown to have their own strengths and weaknesses. Most
RFAs, for instance, enjoy comparative advantages over the IMF with regard to their access to
relevant information and greater knowledge of regional economics and politics. However,
McKay et al. also show huge differences among the various RFAs with respect to governance,
financial resources and analytical expertise, which means that IMF co-operation with RFAs
will have to be designed case by case. The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
(2011) recognised this, pointing out that “collaboration with the IMF should be tailored to each
RFA in a flexible manner in order to take account of region-specific circumstances and the
characteristics of RFAs”. Yet the broad principles for co-operation are simply too broad to be
meaningful. More nuanced guidelines are needed for organising inter-institutional relations, the
division of labour in crisis lending, the terms of joint financial rescue missions, and for sur-
veillance and analysis.
6 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Figure 1: Comparing different RFAs and the IMF
Source: Compiled with data from McKay et al. (2010; 2011).
Note: The black bars indicate the IMF’s score. MTFA: Medium-term Financial Assistance of the EU; 
NAFA: North American Framework Agreement, involving Canada, Mexico and the US; AMF: Arab
Monetary Fund, with 22 member countries in the Middle East and North Africa; FLAR: Latin
American Reserve Fund, with 7 member countries in Latin America. 
10 McKay et al. (2010) identify six features of particular importance to RFAs in providing effective crisis financ-
ing: (i) the size of the financing pool or accessible resources; (ii) timely access to relevant information; (iii) high
quality analytical expertise; (iv) speed in decision-making; (v) impartiality in lending decisions; and (vi) mech-
anisms for monitoring and enforcing conditionality.
Ulrich Volz
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Organising inter-institutional relations
A crucial question for framing co-operation between RFAs and the IMF relates to how inter-
institutional relations should be arranged (Henning 2011). This has two dimensions. First, how
do RFAs organise their external representation towards the Fund and other multilateral institu-
tions? And second, how does the IMF receive representation from RFAs?
Since eligibility for Fund membership is currently restricted to member states, Henning (2011)
asks whether IMF membership should be extended to regional organisations/RFAs much as the
EU is a member of the World Trade Organisation. RFAs could also grant the IMF observer status.
An alternative that would not require changing the IMF Articles of Agreement, would be to
group member states of RFAs in multiple-state constituencies at the IMF.11 While most current
multiple-state constituencies already group together countries of the same region, this is not
always the case. For instance, Switzerland (which does not belong to the EU or any RFA) rep-
resents Poland, Serbia, and five Central Asian and Eurasian countries. But even for constituen-
cies that comprise countries of the same region, the membership in an IMF constituency is not
identical to membership in RFAs of the region. In Latin America, the seven members of the
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR) – Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela – are distributed in three different constituencies (chaired by Argenti-
na, Brazil and Mexico). Forming a “FLAR constituency” could be an effective way to repre-
sent FLAR in the IMF. In East Asia, there is more overlap between current constituencies and
RFA membership: the constituency currently chaired by Singapore includes all ten ASEAN
member countries, as well as Fiji, Nepal and Tonga, who are not members of ASEAN+3 or the
CMIM.12 ASEAN+3 countries could still try to forge common positions on CMIM-related mat-
ters through their respective IMF representations, and present these to the IMF board.13
European countries’ strong presence on the Executive Board ensures European governments’
close interchange with the Fund, which is not replicable with other regions. Yet despite a very
high level of institutional integration, Europe does not speak with one voice at the IMF. The
EU’s 27 member countries are scattered in ten different constituencies (with France, Germany
and the UK each having their own seat). The 17 euro area members are scattered in eight con-
stituencies. Ireland is in a constituency with Canada, Belize, Jamaica and various small island
states. Spain is grouped with several Latin American countries, and rotates a seat on the Exec-
utive Board with Mexico. Recurring demands for a single EU or euro area seat in the IMF (e.g.
Bini Smaghi 2004) have met with resistance from EU members that have their own Executive
Directors on the Board.14 A single seat for the EU – or at least the euro area – would strength-
en Europe’s voice on the IMF Board, since it would be the IMF’s largest shareholder, and also
facilitate IMF governance reform and provide more room for emerging and developing coun-
tries to have a seat on the Board. Yet individual governments cannot be persuaded to give up
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 7
11 Currently only eight out of the Fund’s 187 member countries have a seat on the IMF’s 24-member Executive
Board: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, China, Saudi Arabia and Russia.
12 China and Japan have their own seats on the IMF’s Executive Board, while a Korean official is currently
Alternate Director in a constituency of 14 Asia-Pacific countries. Hong Kong, SAR, which joined the CMIM
in 2010, is not a member of the IMF.
13 It is unthinkable that China or Japan would give up their seats (and Korea its rotating seat) for a common
ASEAN+3 seat.
14 These are currently Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK.
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their perceived positions of power. However, this European obstinacy should not deter other re-
gions from trying to better organise their IMF representations.
A further option – and the easiest – for organising the representation of RFAs would be to al-
low RFAs to obtain IMF observer status. Although Europe is a special case with 17 countries
sharing a single currency, it still could be used as an example. Since the IMF’s Executive Board
granted the ECB observer status in 2002, the ECB is invited to send a representative to Exec-
utive Board meetings about surveillance over the common monetary and exchange rate policies
of the euro area; the policies of individual euro area members (under Article IV); the role of
the euro in the international monetary system; the World Economic Outlook; reports on inter-
national capital markets; and developments in the global economy (IMF 2010). Moreover, the
ECB is “invited to send a representative to meetings of the Executive Board on agenda items
recognized by the ECB and the Fund to be of mutual interest for the performance of their re-
spective mandates” (ibid.). The ECB representative is also allowed to address the Board about
matters the ECB considers important. This could serve as a model for non-European RFAs. Of
course, RFAs with observer status at the Fund should report and disclose the details of their in-
stitutional arrangements with Fund member countries so as to ensure transparency on both
sides.15
In line with the G20’s flexible approach and taking into account region-specific circumstances,
RFA member countries should discuss these options among themselves as well as with the IMF
Board and either try to organise joint constituencies or seek observer status for “their” RFA.
The division of labour in crisis lending
A second point relates to the division of labour between the IMF and RFAs in crisis lending.
Which circumstances should bring the Fund and RFAs to act as lenders? Should there be any
joint lending, and if so, under what conditions?
With reference to the CMIM, Sussangkarn (2012, 215) argues that RFAs should act as
providers of short-term liquidity with no conditionality, while the Fund should become active
only when it is evident that the underlying problem “is not a short-term temporary liquidity
problem, but a more fundamental one with a need for significant macroeconomic adjustment
policies”. He points out that the CMIM is a short-term swap facility more akin to a central bank
swap than a standard IMF loan, given that the CMIM allows the monetary authority of a mem-
ber country to swap its local currency for an agreed amount of US dollars from the CMIM re-
serve pool. According to the rules at the time the CMIM was launched, the maturity of each
CMIM drawing was 90 days, with an option to roll over the swap up to seven times (i.  e. about
two years in all).16 According to Sussangkarn (2012, 215), the CMIM should thus be seen as
“a crisis prevention facility meant to assist an economy in dealing with short-term temporary
shortages of foreign currencies such as when a rapid capital outflow occurs like in the case of
8 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
15 See Henning’s (2006, 177–178) proposal for a set of principles that RFAs should adopt in order to guide their
relationships with the Fund.
16 In May 2012 the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2012, 7.iii) agreed to “length-
en the maturity and supporting period for the IMF linked portion from 90 days to 1 year and from 2 years to
3 years, respectively; and those for the IMF de-linked portion from 90 days to 6 months and from 1 year to 2
years, respectively”.
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South Korea during the subprime crisis.” In such cases it would “not make sense to impose
conditionality of an IMF loan on the economy” (ibid.), hence Sussangkarn recommends doing
away with the IMF link in its present form. In his view, the IMF should get involved once “an
economy’s requested rollover of the swap exceeds a number of times – may be three or four
times” (Sussangkarn 2012, 216) since this would signal fundamental weaknesses that would
call for structural adjustment.
This proposal raises two concerns. First, where it is clear from the start that a particular econ-
omy does not simply face a temporary shortage of foreign currency liquidity but rather has
structural deficiencies, valuable time could be lost in making the necessary structural adjust-
ments, since the country’s government might be tempted to delay reforms, and instead intro-
duce temporary liquidity support – which would not help to solve the underlying problems. The
challenge is to distinguish problems of liquidity and of solvency, since the transition between
these is often blurred and a problem with liquidity can quickly turn into a problem of solvency
if not addressed quickly.
The second concern relates to the IMF’s role as a “bad cop” that takes over RFA crisis man-
agement after about a year of unconditional liquidity support. Were this the yardstick for the
division of labour between RFAs and the IMF, it would imply that the IMF would only get in-
volved in the tough cases, where painful structural adjustments are needed. Does the IMF want
to be in the position to take the blame, leaving RFAs responsible for the “friendly” bit?
An alternative to Sussangkarn’s approach of sequencing RFA and IMF involvement would be
exploring the establishment of links between the Fund’s new precautionary facilities (the Flex-
ible Credit Line, FCL, and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line, PLL) and available contingent
financing from the respective RFAs.17 In the CMIM case, the adjustment to the current IMF
link that is needed to make the CMIM fully operational (as argued above) could take the form
of recognising the FCL/PLL as a sufficient condition for drawing on the CMIM beyond the
first 30% (cf. Henning 2011). This would be a way of maintaining an IMF-CMIM link while
allowing CMIM member countries to draw on the CMIM without needing to undergo a stan-
dard IMF programme. As Henning (2011) points out, this would also facilitate activation of the
CMIM and help reduce the Fund’s stigma in the region.18 The non-linked portion could also be
increased from the current 30% – perhaps to 50%.19 Establishing similar linkages with other
RFAs could help improve interaction between RFAs and the Fund while also making the Fund’s
precautionary arrangements more attractive to member countries.
Following a heated discussion in early 2010 about whether the IMF should be involved in the
resolution of the European debt crisis, informal co-operation in parallel disbursements has
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17 In May 2012 the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors decided to introduce a “CMIM
Precautionary Line”, a facility modelled upon the IMF’s recently developed crisis prevention facilities. But
there is no agreement yet on the details of this facility.
18 A decade ago, Henning (2002) proposed that the ASEAN+3 agree that prequalification for the Contingent
Credit Line, which the Fund abandoned in 2003 due to a lack of takers, should satisfy the CMI definition of
an IMF programme.
19 There were considerable differences among the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at
their May 2012 meeting regarding the increase of the IMF de-linked portion in 2012. China and Japan – the
two biggest contributors to the CMIM – only reluctantly ceded to the demand of ASEAN countries to increase
the de-linked portion from 20% to 30% and include a reference to a further increase to 40% in 2014 that
would then be “subject to review should conditions warrant” (ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors 2012, 7.ii).
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taken place in Europe between the new European facilities and the IMF. Although lending un-
der the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Sta-
bility Facility (EFSF) has not been legally tied to IMF disbursement, the IMF and European
authorities understand that both will proceed simultaneously.20 The disbursement of funds is
approved by the “troika”, which is made up of officials from the IMF, the European Commis-
sion and the ECB. The troika also observes enforcement of programme conditionality. Howev-
er, while EFSM/EFSF lending is implicitly linked to IMF programmes, it remains open whether
this practice will also apply to the new, permanent ESM.21 The IMF’s involvement in manag-
ing the crisis in Greece is widely held to be a failure because the IMF, which has taken a
junior role in the European crisis, agreed to a flawed crisis strategy based on unrealistic
assumptions.
The procedure for applying to IMF and RFA financing should also be clarified. EU member
states are formally required to consult with the European Commission before asking the IMF,
or any other international financial institution, for financial assistance. Unsurprisingly, the Eu-
ropean Commission was not happy when Poland sought its FCL arrangement with the Fund in
April 2009 without giving them prior notice. (Poland argued that the FCL was not a full IMF
programme but rather an insurance facility.) Other RFAs lack comparable provisions.
How can a joint financial rescue by the IMF and an RFA be arranged?
Thirdly, it is necessary to discuss the modalities and negotiation of co-operation in lending,
which involves a (formal or informal) agreement regarding the respective IMF and RFA shares
of contributions and the terms of assistance in relation to maturity, interest rates and possibili-
ties of renewing (Henning 2011). The respective loan size depends on the type of lending dis-
cussed above, as well as the “firepower” of the respective institution, that is the amount avail-
able for lending. The amounts available under the prospective ESM and an extended CMIM
will enable these RFAs to act on par with – or even outsize – the Fund’s lending, whereas
other RFAs, such as FLAR, have only a fraction of the Fund’s resources at their disposal.22
Regarding the terms of assistance, the G20 Principles (§5) appropriately demand that “[c]on-
sistency of lending conditions should be sought to the extent possible”. Henning (2011) points
out that lending rates need not be identical, but that forum shopping and institutional arbitrage
should be avoided (see also McKay et al. 2012). The same applies to the policy conditionality
attached to lending. Governments of crisis countries might be inclined to “conditionality
shop” – to borrow from the financing arrangement that attaches the weakest conditionality to
10 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
20 The EFSM, which was launched in May 2010, provides that the European Commission can borrow up to EUR
60 billion in financial markets on behalf of the EU under an implicit EU budget guarantee. All EU members
are eligible to apply for EFSM financing. It is reviewed every six months. The EFSF was created by the
member states of the euro area following decisions taken in May 2010. It is backed by guarantee commitments
from euro area member states for a total of EUR 780 billion and has a lending capacity of EUR 440 billion.
EFSF financing is available only for euro area members. The EFSF is only temporary and will be succeeded
by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was inaugurated in October 2012.
21 Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism states: “The ESM will cooperate very
closely with the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) in providing stability support. The active participation
of the IMF will be sought, both at technical and financial level. A euro area Member State requesting finan-
cial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF.”
22 FLAR had a subscribed capital of USD 2.3 billion as of 19 August 2011.
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its loan (or none at all) – which could lead to necessary reforms being deferred and increase
the risk of the crisis causing even bigger problems.
A further issue to be discussed ex ante between the Fund and RFAs so as to avoid conflicts dur-
ing crisis negotiations is the creditors’ seniority in cases of joint lending by the Fund and RFAs.
The IMF has enjoyed de facto preferential creditor status in accordance with its status as an in-
ternational financial institution. The EFSF has not claimed preferred creditor status, since
“[p]rivate investors would be reluctant to provide loans to the country concerned if there were
too many preferred creditors” (EFSF 2012, 3). But it is not clear that other RFAs will follow
this stance, so this issue should be clarified; ideally, RFAs should endorse the G20’s demand
that “RFAs must respect the preferred creditor status of the IMF” (§5).
Co-operation in surveillance and analysis
A fourth point that needs to be addressed relates to co-operation in financial market surveillance
and analysis. While in principle, it is desirable to get independent analysis from the IMF and the
RFAs – which ideally would stimulate competition for better analysis – co-operation is needed
to ensure the efficient use of resources and dissemination of information.
Several concrete steps could be taken: the IMF could invite RFAs to Article IV surveillance
missions and (together with the World Bank) to Financial Sector Assessment Programmes, sub-
ject to approval by the respective government. The current practice of the IMF, European
authorities and EU member states collaborating on surveillance, with European officials in-
volved in Article IV consultations, could serve as a model for other regional frameworks.23
Discussions and information exchanges during joint missions would not only increase overall
understanding of the economy in question, but also help build trust between staff from the IMF
and RFAs, and facilitate institutional co-operation in times of crisis. Regular staff exchanges and
joint training programmes would further enhance knowledge about how all the institutions func-
tion. The IMF could also provide capacity-building measures for RFA staff at one of its seven
regional training centres – just as it offers training for officials from its member countries.
Enhanced co-operation should not erode the independence of RFAs and reduce them to mere out-
posts of the IMF, however. The RFA’s analytical independence should be maintained, and a compe-
tition of ideas should be encouraged in order to avoid the “silo mentality and insular culture” for
which the Fund was criticised by its own Independent Evaluation Office (IEO 2011, 1).
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 11
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tations to EU member countries, European officials are not part of the delegation.
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5 Conclusions
In the decade following the Asian financial crisis, the IMF underwent its own reputational and fi-
nancial crisis, during which it was forced to lay off staff on a large scale for the first time. Although
the IMF is back in business, it urgently needs further governance reform, including a reform of
quota shares, changes regarding country representation on the Executive Board, and the selection
of the managing director and other senior staff. Building on the recent introduction of precaution-
ary facilities, the Fund also ought to continue to reform its lending tools.
With the Fund still stigmatised, RFAs have become an attractive alternative to IMF lending, and
a means for emerging economies to insist on further IMF governance reform. While RFAs can
be constructive in preventing or combating financial crises, and a healthy competition for sur-
veillance and ideas between RFAs and the IMF should be welcome, dangers to (global) finan-
cial stability could arise should an RFA undermine the Fund’s authority and complicate the
Fund’s work instead of complementing it. Efficient forms of interaction between RFAs and the
Fund are needed. Co-operation would also help the Fund to engage with the different regions
and increase member countries’ sense of ownership in joint programmes – which in turn would
help the Fund to shed its stigma.
The G20 has recognised there is a strong case for ex ante co-operation between the IMF and
RFAs in order to avoid institutional arbitrage and ensure efficient co-operation in times of cri-
sis. While principles and modalities of co-operation should be general enough to account for
differences among RFAs, the G20 Principles endorsed at the Cannes Summit in November
2011 are too general to be meaningful. More specific guidelines are needed regarding inter-
institutional relations, the division of labour in lending, surveillance and analysis, and the terms
of joint financial rescue missions. In this respect, the adoption of a “code of conduct”
(Henning 2006) to guide IMF-RFA relations would be helpful. The IMF should actively seek
to negotiate individual agreements with the respective RFAs, taking into account regional
specifics and differences. RFAs that agree on a formal code of conduct could be granted ob-
server status at the Fund.
The current co-operation between the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB to solve the
European sovereign debt and banking crisis sets an important precedent for co-operation
between the Fund and other regional arrangements. Not only are European countries among the
most influential members of the Fund and heavily represented on its Executive Board, but the
EU is also the world’s most advanced form of regional financial co-operation. European poli-
cymakers should recognise the far-reaching implications of how Europe crafts its relationship
with the Fund.
12 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
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